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PERFORMANCE OF THE SYSTEM III:
APPELLATE BODY

Comments
SERGE FRECHETTE*, C. MICHAEL HATHAWAY**, AND VICTOR Do PRADO***

SERGE FRECHETTE: Frechette offered a general overview of factors to take
into account in assessing the work of the Appellate Body. He stated that the
Appellate Body was still at an early stage of development, but it is not too
soon to begin asking some fundamental question as to how the Appellate Body's
function has been exercised and how it should be exercised. In its early years,
the Appellate Body has dealt with some of the most complex issues in trade law.
It is now at a critical juncture in its evolution.
Frechette stated that article 3.2 of the DSU embodies two values: predictability
and security. In evaluating whether the Appellate Body has achieved predictability
and security, it is important to focus on the process, as opposed to the outcomes
of particular cases. The analyses that lead to particular outcomes will have implications beyond individual cases. As decisions of the Appellate Body will be taken
into account in national and international policy making, WTO members must
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Professor of Law at the Georgetown University Law Center, and is a member of the American Bar
Association's International Trade Steering Committee.
***Victor Do Prado is Special Advisor to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Government of Brazil.
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have confidence that their policy decisions are being made against the correct
benchmarks.
Frechette stated that we cannot expect perfection from the Appellate Body,
given the compromises that underlie the language of the rules that the Body is
required to apply. The Appellate Body is not dealing with models of drafting
clarity. Further, the compressed time frames under which the Appellate Body
must work necessarily affect the deliberative process.
Furthermore in assessing the work of the Appellate Body, it is important to
consider how the panels are performing their tasks. The reports of the panels
affect the approach that the Appellate Body takes in performing its review.
With the foregoing comments in mind, there are two issues for consideration.
First, the Appellate Body is limited to interpreting and applying agreements. It
cannot expand or diminish the rights and obligations of the parties. Accordingly,
WTO members should consider how far the Appellate Body can go to fill gaps and
resolve ambiguities in agreements between parties. Second, the WTO members
should consider whether the Appellate Body is giving sufficient guidance. In
some cases, the Appellate Body has provided clear and concise explanations for
its conclusions; in others, it has not. These two issues must be examined as part
of a general discussion within the WTO system.
C. MICHAEL HATHAWAY

I. The Appellate Body: A Job Well Done, but Can It Do Better?
As a new dispute settlement entity, the Appellate Body has proven to be remarkably successful in establishing a high level of respect for its decisions. One
measure of its success is the extent to which panels utilize the Appellate Body's
work. Another more practical measure is that, to date, each of the panel decisions
has been the subject of an appeal. The Film case may be the first panel decision
not to be reviewed by the Appellate Body. The quality of the reasoning in the
Appellate Body's decisions has generally been high, but those decisions have
not yet been subjected to rigorous and critical public analysis. Nor have they
been subject to the test of time that will involve additional cases which increasingly
explore the gray areas of WTO agreements and existing determinations.
A. A

QUICK CRITIQUE OF SOME DECISIONS

The Appellate Body's first decision, Reformulated Gasoline,served to establish
the Appellate Body as an important factor in disputes. The process ran on time, and
the recommendation was implemented on time. In Japan-AlcoholicBeverages II,
the Appellate Body provided new guidance on the interpretation of article III,
rejecting the "aim and effects" tests most recently enunciated in U.S. Auto
Taxes. While implementation of Japan-Alcoholic Beverages I was subject to
a settlement agreement, future cases and consultations involving South Korea
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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and Chile raise the questions of relitigation and procedural inflexibility that may
eventually cause harm to the dispute settlement process. In EC-Bananas, the
Appellate Body opened the door to private counsel participation in a decision
that could eventually alter the course of dispute settlement. Time will tell whether
the camel truly has its nose under the edge of the tent.
EC-Bananasand EC-Hormones, as do other cases, raise the very difficult
problem of implementation. Hormones may have opened the door to the introduction of inappropriate vagueness in the interpretation of obligations concerning
risk assessments by allowing non-scientific factors to be taken into account.
Additionally, the determination to reverse the panel on its application of Article
5.5 of the SPS Agreement was at least in part based upon the Appellate Body
drawing a different inference from the facts of the case. There the Appellate
Body stated that it "reverses the Panel's findings and conclusions on Article
5.5." Is the factual inference for the fact finder or the final arbiter of legal
interpretation, and if so, what standards apply? Future cases may explore this
issue further.
B.

CAN THE QUALITY KEEP UP WITH THE VOLUME OF CASES?

It has been pointed out that by the summer of 1998, as many as seven proceedings
may be before the Appellate Body, and that this unprecedented number could triple
later in the year. This bulge in the case load may be delayed by the burden of translation, which is yet another indication that the system was not designed to absorb
such a significant volume of cases. Absent an unlikely decrease in the parties' willingness to resort to the Appellate Body, some alteration must accommodate the
work load. There are three solutions-increase resources, increase the time allowed for determinations, or reduce the time spent on some cases.
Each of the first two solutions will require a crisis to prompt further examination, and they will be difficult to accept. In the category of increasing resources,
one sub-option has substantive appeal: that is to convert the Appellate Body to
a permanent judiciary with additional members able to serve essentially as do
retired jurists in the United States. A full analysis of such a system may actually
prove to have some cost saving elements, and much can be said for a permanent
judicial branch for the WTO. The major risk being expressed appears to be the
politicization of the selection process. On that point, the best protection may be
to establish a selection process that insulates the final selection from political
horse trading. Such a process could include independent evaluation of prospective
nominees. The administrative burden of translation and delays caused by the
selection of panelists could be solved by financial resources. This will be difficult,
but less so than other alternatives such as functioning with written submissions
in a single language (English for example), or imposing costs of translation on
the parties. In addition to the pressure to delay determinations, the selection of
panelists is becoming a problem that is driven by lack of resources. Increasing
FALL 1998
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cases drain local government representatives from their delegations in an effort
to avoid expenses for private panelists. The cost of such an alternative would be
difficult to absorb, but could be mitigated by increasing the permanent resources of
the WTO's Legal Services, a step that is already necessary.
Increasing the time to review cases would help to resolve one of the greatest
problems in the system-the ability to maintain violations for extended periods
of time without compensation. Longer time periods would undercut support for
the dispute settlement process. The third option is to reduce the time spent on
some cases. Here, the Appellate Body could unclog its calendar and the process
by refusing to spend enormous amounts of time fully relitigating cases such as
JapaneseAlcoholic Beverages II. As determinations become accepted practice
on key points of law, in appropriate cases the Appellate Body could simply
determine that it has previously determined the basic legal issue before it, and
set a very short schedule. Revisions could be considered to allow for remand to
a panel, the imposition of costs, and expeditious resort to arbitration for compensation far sooner than fifteen months. In addition, a special master could follow
implementation to expedite reconsideration of cases brought to challenge slight
revisions in implementing measures.
C. Is

THERE ROOM FOR A REMAND?

Short of full consideration of appeals, the Appellate Body should be granted
authority to refer cases back to a panel for action consistent with accepted practice.
Such a practice could also permit the Appellate Body to refuse consideration of
cases where there are no novel issues of law, or where the panel applies the law
properly.
II. Enforcement: Does the Appellate Body Have the Tools to Do the Job?
A.

APPEALS AND DELAYS

During the negotiation of the DSU, it was not apparent that almost every case
would be appealed. With a number of new agreements presenting novel issues,
appeals can be expected at least until interpretations provide well-settled guidance.
However, the appellate process can add substantial delay in the ultimate resolution
of disputes by delaying authorization of withdrawal of concessions. Ultimately,
the process is leverage for compliance and negotiated settlement on the terms
of implementation. Resources currently allocated to dispute resolution are inadequate to provide what is necessary to reduce delays, much less to avoid them.
B.

SANCTIONS AND COMPENSATION

The reasonable time for compliance appears to be settling on the maximum
time of fifteen months. This extends the point of leverage of compensation and
may ultimately lead to increased retaliation, something the DSU sought to avoid.
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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Consideration should be given to allowing withdrawal of concessions at an earlier
point in time, especially in what are essentially relitigation cases. Allowing the
compensation to be calculated, if not imposed, from the date of a panel determination would provide additional incentive to secure compliance and to avoid the
pressure to take unilateral countermeasures. In addition, imposing costs on losing
appellees, especially in cases that are essentially relitigation of slightly altered
measures, would serve as a deterrent. It would also be appropriate to have parties
post bond for costs in appeals to avoid delays in payment.
III. Will the Appellate Body Get the Hard Cases? Will Disputes Map the
Terrain of Future Negotiations?
One concern with the volume of new obligations resulting from the WTO
Agreements is that the sheer volume of clear violations, reinforced by the Film
panel determination, will encourage members burdened with heavy caseloads to
pursue clear winners rather than important but difficult cases. While the Appellate
Body is not authorized to establish new obligations, it is authorized to interpret
what is there, including ambiguous provisions. Rather than hard cases making
bad law, they make new law which is bad in the view of the losing party. Hard
cases also point out the need for new negotiations and new clarification of obligations. Such negotiations are the only practical substitute for a legislative body
for the world's trading system. Major changes are likely once again to result in
new agreements that are substituted for the existing obligations. Granted this is
an awkward process, but other forms of agreement will likely face insurmountable
procedural obstacles open to use as leverage.
IV. Conclusions
The Appellate Body is performing its function with a level of expertise and professionalism that is serving the WTO system very well. Critical analysis of determination will improve the process over time. The major crisis is one of resources to
do the job. Resource demands can be met with increased financial contributions
for staff, such as for interpreters and additional legal experts, and refinement in
the legal authority of the Appellate Body to permit the use of accepted judicial tools
to streamline litigation and prevent relitigation. These issues should be debated
fully in the year of review, with improvements implemented in advance of the U. S.
congressional review at the end of five years of operation. The objective for the
five year review should be a consensus of support for the DSU and a track record
of addressing problems as they arise. Failure to act responsibly in the year of review
may make the year 2000 the year of living dangerously.
VICTOR Do PRADO: Do Prado commented that in evaluating the work of the
Appellate Body, it is useful to consider what the negotiators originally had in
mind. The original idea was that the panels would be less legalistic and more
FALL 1998
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attached to the real-world facts than the Appellate Body. The purpose of the
Appellate Body was to get a more legalistic perspective by taking a step away
from the particular facts of a dispute.
Do Prado observed that panels in the GATT system had an audience: the
contracting parties. Panels were concerned about whether their reports would
be adopted. Therefore, sometimes they compromised their analysis to ensure
adoption of reports. It was thought that the same thing would happen under the
WTO. Also, the negotiators did not expect every panel report to be appealed to
the Appellate Body.
However, under the WTO system, panels do not write for the same audience
that they wrote for under the GATT. Some observers say that panels now focus
on the Appellate Body, trying to minimize the risk of modification by the Appellate
Body. Do Prado disagreed with this view. He stated that panels have been very
focused on their tasks at hand, rather than on the Appellate Body. They may
quote past Appellate Body reports, but they are not focused on how the Appellate
Body will treat their reports.
Do Prado queried whether the Appellate Body itself has an audience. He said
that some observers believe that it does not, since its decisions are adopted automatically. Others suggest that the Appellate Body's audience is the party that
lost before the panel below. According to the latter hypothesis, the Appellate
Body attempts to modify decisions to make defeat more palatable. In a number
of cases, the Appellate Body has made defeat less bitter, Canada-Periodicals
being a notable exception. Reformulated Gasoline and Beef Hormones are two
cases in which the Appellate Body made future compliance more politically possible. Do Prado noted that if the latter hypothesis is true, the Appellate Body's
function would be consistent with GATT tradition, but contrary to the judicialization of dispute settlement that was supposed to occur under the WTO.
Do Prado raised the issue of the Appellate Body's authority to remand cases
to the panels, stating that the Appellate Body's consideration of disputes is limited
to issues of law covered in panel reports. He queried whether the Body should
remand cases where it is unable to reach a decision pursuant to the DSU.
Finally, Do Prado addressed the style of Appellate Body reports, noting that
Appellate Body reports contain language unprecedented in the GATT. For instance, in Reformulated Gasoline, the Appellate Body stated that the panel had
''erred in law" by not deciding an issue. Do Prado questioned whether a panel
can, in fact, err in law by declining to reach an issue, and noted that on occasion
the Appellate Body has used language that is not very complimentary to the panel
below, a practice that is inadvisable. However, despite minor flaws, the Appellate
Body has done a remarkable job, given the constraints under which it has worked.
QUESTION AND ANSWER SUMMARY: Vanessa Sciarra observed that in the U.S.
judicial system an appellate court will sometimes decline to explicate its legal
VOL. 32, NO. 3
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reasoning. During his presentation, Serge Frechette stated that the Appellate
Body also sometimes declines to explicate its reasoning. Sciarra asked whether
that practice is healthy, bad for the system, or simply to be expected, given the
political dynamics at play.
Frechette responded that it is important to know how the Appellate Body
reaches its conclusions. This need is particularly strong, since the entire dispute
settlement system is so new. In domestic legal systems, given the foundation of
history on which a court is building, there is not always a need for the court to
explain how it has reached its conclusions. In the WTO, by contrast, the demand
for predictability and security requires that panels and the Appellate Body provide
clear guidance by giving as full an explanation as possible for its conclusions.
Frechette cautioned that he was not saying that the Appellate Body had not fulfilled
that demand. But occasionally, respondents are found to be in violation of their
WTO obligations, and yet they are given very little guidance. It is the guidance
that the Appellate Body provides that will determine how countries come into
compliance. Member countries and panels need to understand how provisions
of the various agreements of the WTO will be interpreted in the future by the
Appellate Body, under similar circumstances.
Michael Hathaway stated that if the basis for a decision is clear from a prior
case, the Appellate Body has no need to lay out its reasoning all over again in
a subsequent case. Also, there may be instances in which the Appellate Body
believes that the facts before it do not present appropriate circumstances in which
to announce a rule that it may otherwise be ready to announce (just as domestic
courts do). He added that the WTO dispute settlement system has not yet reached
the point where the Appellate Body can provide the guidance that a U.S. court
might provide, for instance, in issuing wide-ranging injunctive relief. In many
instances, the most that can be expected from an Appellate Body report, at this
point, is an opinion that the defending party is in violation of its obligations,
that it must come into compliance, and that if it does not come into compliance,
it will have to return to the WTO for a determination of what compensation it
owes.
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